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Economic Primer & Policy Analysis:  




Rent control policies are controversial. They create significant winners and losers 
and raise serious questions about the prioritization of certain segments of society 
with others and economic concerns with moral ones. With such dynamics, it is a 
given that there are no easy answers, at least not to those not given to ideological 
posturing. The fact is that housing is both an economic system and a human one, 
with very real ramifications for those involved, which just happens to be everyone. 
 
In 2019, the State of Oregon passed SB-608, a bill intended to address two primary 
concerns: rental cost growth and tenant evictions. While the law applies to the 
entire state, it was largely a response to conditions in Oregon’s largest city and 
metropolitan area, Portland. In some ways, it follows a long line of rent control 
policies in place in many jurisdictions in the United States, but it differs markedly 
from most of these. 
 
This report will lay out some of the basic dynamics that relate to short-run 
increases in demand and policies such as rent control meant to address them. It is 
frequently established in economic literature that rent control policies create 
inefficiencies in the housing market. Some of the most common will be addressed 
here, before concluding with an overview of SB-608 and how it relates to and 
addresses these concerns. 
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In 2019, the State of Oregon passed SB-608, a bill intended to address two primary 
concerns: rental housing cost growth and tenant evictions.1 While the law applies 
to the entire state, it was largely a response to conditions in Oregon’s largest city 
and metropolitan area, Portland. While similar in some ways to rent control policies 
enacted elsewhere in the United States, Oregon’s policy differs markedly from most 
of these in some key ways. In fact, it might be a stretch to even label the new 
legislation a ‘rent control’ policy at all. Unlike many other such laws, it doesn’t 
freeze rent or keep rental housing costs below long-term equilibrium. Further, the 
rent growth cap is only one line of a larger bill intended to protect renter tenants 
from possible abuse by landlords in hot housing markets. In this report, we will 
discuss the motivating factors that drove the creation of this policy, the economic 
fundamentals of rent control measures and their implicit inefficiencies, and how 
SB-608 addresses these issues in its construction. 
 
 
Figure 1: Portland population trends (1940-2020). Source: American FactFinder, census.gov. 
 
Portland’s demographic trends mirror many American cities in the era following 
World War II. After the War, the city suffered from significant disinvestment as 
residents flocked to the suburbs. While the larger metropolitan statistical area 
(MSA) continued to grow – and its urban form developed mostly in the form of 
 
1 Senate Bill 608, 80th Oregon Legislative Assembly, 2019 Regular Session, 
https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/2019R1/Measures/Overview/SB608. 
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detached single-family housing – the city itself largely stagnated (Figure 1). 
Without new residents, housing supply in the city itself dried up and deteriorated. 
Like many American cities, however, Portland saw a resurgence of population 
growth after the 1980s as younger people began choosing to return to the city. And 
while new construction did increase during this period, it hardly matched the 






Figure 2: Residential permits in Oregon. Source: Oregon Office of Economic Analysis.2 
 
This discrepancy led to rising costs as demand outpaced new supply. This trend 
rapidly accelerated following the Great Recession as Portland’s population 
 
2 Oregon Office of Economic Analysis, “Update on Oregon Housing Starts,” October 2, 2019, 
https://oregoneconomicanalysis.com/2019/10/02/update-on-oregon-housing-starts/. 
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boomed. Since housing supply trailed demand (as is common), housing prices 
skyrocketed, straining the budgets of existing residents whose wages were not 
increasing at a commensurate rate, often leading to increased displacement. This 
dynamic drove calls for policy solutions to address ballooning costs for rental 
housing, though there was only limited movement on the political front until the 
past few years, culminating in SB-608. 
 
Before discussing the specific provisions of SB-608, this report will lay out 
some of the basic dynamics that relate to short-run increases in demand and policies 
such as rent control meant to address them. It is frequently established in economic 
literature that rent control policies create inefficiencies in the housing market. Some 
of the most common will be addressed here, before concluding with an overview 
of SB-608 and how it relates to and addresses these concerns. 
 
 
ECONOMIC FUNDAMENTALS: RENT CONTROL 
 
Rent control policies can be viewed through a short-term and a long-term lens. 
More often than not, rent control policies are proposed as a reaction to localized 
short-term increases in demand pinching existing supply.3 The resulting rapid price 
increases can have tremendous effects on households given the scope of housing 
costs in most household budgets, especially when paired with slower-growing or 
static wages. In Figure 3 below, we’ve modeled such a scenario. 
 
In this model, we show short-term housing supply as perfectly inelastic, that 
is that quantity is constrained to existing levels. This assumption is based on the 
long lead time inherent in housing supply. We have also shown the long-run supply 
under the assumption that housing is a fixed production cost enterprise (that is 
producing each extra unit of housing costs the same as the previous, an assumption 
we will relax when we look at rent control from a longer-term lens). Under these 
assumptions, an increase in demand from D to D’ yields a price increase from P0 to 
PS as an increasing number of potential tenants are bidding on a limited supply of 
rental units. This price increase is captured by landlords in the form of economic 
rent, that is payments in excess of their costs (maintenance plus opportunity costs). 
The economic rent is called quasi-rent, which landlords will continue to collect 





3 Lee S. Friedman, The Microeconomics of Public Policy Analysis (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2002), 516. 
4 Friedman, The Microeconomics of Public Policy Analysis, 517. 
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Figure 3: Short-term rent freeze in response to demand increase. 
 
Under the conditions of such a surge in demand, a jurisdiction can impose a rent 
freeze, holding price at P0, in which case quasi-rent shifts from suppliers to tenants, 
as those in units can sell the rights to those units to those bidding for them.5 In such 
a model, in the long-term, supply also expands to QL and the market is once again 
at equilibrium. Under these assumptions (short-term and fixed-cost supply), there 
is no inefficiency in rent control policies, only a question of distribution of the 
quasi-rent either to landlords or tenants, in which case questions of political 
economy will dominate the discussion. 
 
Now looking at our model with a longer-term view (Figure 4), we can relax 
our assumptions about fixed-cost supply. In truth, housing supply costs do increase 
in the long-term as increasing production drives increased construction wages and 
supply costs, generating an upward slope.6 Under these assumptions, the demand 
surge initially drives a price increase from P0 to PS, once again yielding quasi-rent 
to landlords as residents bid up the price for rental units. In the long-term, supply 
will expand from Q0 to QL and price will reach equilibrium at PL. But as before, the 
initial surge in price creates intense market pressures on residents as rent soaks up 
more and more of budgets that are not expanding at a commensurate rate, driving 
 
5 Arthur O’Sullivan, Urban Economics, 8th Ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Irwin, 2012), 401. 
6 Friedman, The Microeconomics of Public Policy Analysis, 519. 
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political support for rent relief measures. If a rent freeze is put in place at the initial 
price, P0, supply will not expand as the cost of producing new housing is above the 
imposed price, creating a perceived shortage of housing equal to Q0-QDC, the 
quantity demanded at the imposed price. This distortion creates significant 
deadweight loss equal to the triangle ABC, though it does shift what would be 
increased producer surplus at the market equilibrium C to consumers (rectangle 
PLP0AO). In such a circumstance, landlords and housing suppliers are undoubtedly 
losers at they see their potential surplus reduced by PLP0AC. However, tenants 
might be gainers or losers under such a policy, depending on whether their gains 
from the shift of PLP0AO from producers to consumers is greater than their loss of 
consumer surplus from deadweight loss, represented by triangle OBC.7 Such a rent 
freeze in the long-term is dramatically distortionary and does produce significant 
economic inefficiency, especially as demand continues to increase due to 
demographic shifts and population growth without expansion of supply. 
 
 
Figure 4: Long-term rent freeze in response to demand increase. 
 
 
7 Friedman, The Microeconomics of Public Policy Analysis, 519. 
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An alternative to a rent freeze would be a rent control policy that allows price to 
rise to the equilibrium level in the long-term but prevents a dramatic price shift in 
the short-term. Such a policy would contain the economic rents that are created but 
still allow supply to expand as long as the policy does not keep rents below market 
equilibrium in the long-term. This would significantly reduce the economic 
inefficiency of the policy while still protecting tenants from damaging housing cost 
increases. Oregon’s SB-608 looks more like this policy option as it allows rental 
price increases of 7% + CPI (consumer price index). Such a ceiling allows prices 
to rise as supply, maintenance, and opportunity costs, rise but prevent the price 
gouging that might occur under the circumstances Portland has experienced since 
the Great Recession. 
 
 
RENT CONTROL INEFFICIENCIES 
 
In addition to the fundamental price distortions and attendant economic 
inefficiencies possible with rent control policies, there are a few other market 
inefficiencies and inequities that are worth mentioning. In this section, we will 
briefly discuss the distortions and consequences of rent control policies on housing 
exchange, capitalized property values, housing disinvestment, and land use 
conversion. Each of these have subtle effects that tend to add up over time and 
across geography to detract from the effectiveness of rent control policies. 
 
Housing Exchange 
Rent control policies create disequilibrium in exchange for housing. In general, the 
distortionary effects of rent control policies create a discrepancy between some 
units or renters and others, leaving room for a deal, which while improving overall 
efficiency, never quite captures the total economic loss generated by such policies. 
This can create significant equity issues (particularly in regard to horizontal equity) 
that are often left unaddressed by rent control proponents by creating winners and 
losers.8 
 
Who bears the burdens of these inefficiencies depends on the specific 
contours of the policy, though broadly speaking, it falls on whether the policy 
centers tenants or housing units as the target of control. In cases where the unit is 
the target of control, it creates an incentive to buy into those units by paying some 
other agent, whether an existing tenant, the landowner, or a rental agent to gain 
access to a controlled unit. For example, if a newcomer would save $1000 by 
moving into a rent-controlled unit, they might be willing to spend upwards of $900 
 
8 O’Sullivan, Urban Economics, 401. 
Brown: Rent Control Policies & Oregon SB-608





in order to access that unit and still come out ahead. In this case, the economic rent 
that the policy is intended to capture is simply moved around from one agent to 
another, with some loss attributed to the transaction.9 
 
In cases where tenants are the beneficiaries of control, there is an incentive 
to remain in the same unit to maintain the price discount, regardless of whether that 
unit is ideal for the tenant. This decreased mobility not only locks up housing units 
but creates further inefficiencies that would be avoided if the tenant were not 
disincentivized from finding a more appropriate housing situation. For example, a 
couple moves into a unit and becomes the beneficiary of a price discount from rent 
control as long as they stay in that unit. However, as time moves on, the couple’s 
circumstance changes (a new job in further from their home, a change in income, 
children). In a free market with minimal transaction costs, this couple might 
relocate to another unit (closer to work to decrease transportation costs or to a 
bigger unit to accommodate children), but under rent control centered on tenancy, 
the price discount might be significant enough to deter them. Not only does this 
affect their utility maximization, but other people for whom that unit might 
otherwise be available are subject to reduced market options. 
 
A second concern for policies that center on tenancy is an increasing gap 
between what a renter is charged in rent and what the market would bear if left 
uncontrolled. This burden falls principally on the landowner, who in such 
circumstances has a significant incentive to find means to evict the tenant in order 
to restore rent to market rates. This is one reason Oregon’s SB-608 includes 
significant protections for tenants, especially those whose tenure matures past the 
first year. 
 
Capitalized Property Values 
The loss of economic rent to landowners from rent control policies is not distributed 
evenly. Such policies create winners and losers among that group as well, often 
without regard for ability to weather such circumstances. By capping rent or rent 
increases, these policies create distortion in the housing market for owners as well 
by decreasing expected revenue. This decrease in revenue is captured in the 
capitalized value of the property. The capitalized value is price paid for the property 
accounting for future value, which includes potential revenue from rental. With rent 
controls in place, rental properties are worth less because the expected value of that 
property over the life of ownership is reduced.10  
 
 
9 Friedman, The Microeconomics of Public Policy Analysis, 524. 
10 Friedman, The Microeconomics of Public Policy Analysis, 530. 
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However, this loss only accrues to current owners. This is important since 
current owners, assuming they bought a rental property with the intent to rent, paid 
the previous owner based on the capitalized value pre-control. Therefore, an owner 
who sells a property just prior the imposition of rent control is paid for the expected 
future revenues of that property by converting it to cash at sale, revenues which the 
new owner will not realize. The new owner will then be subject to a potentially 
significant windfall loss. This horizontal equity issue is augmented by a potential 
vertical equity issue, in that large landowners, including large banks and property 
developers, are more likely to have a diversified portfolio and more able to weather 
the capital losses on some properties, whereas a small-scale landowner paying a 
mortgage based on the capitalized value of the property pre-control will see 
revenues decrease, possibly below what enables them to maintain the property. 
 
Housing Disinvestment & Land Use Conversion 
Another potential inefficiency intrinsic to rent control policies is the market 
distortion related to housing investment. If rent control policies reduce potential 
rental revenue and therefore the capitalized value of a rental property, the 
opportunity cost of investing in rental housing development increases 
substantially.11 If that opportunity cost (the potential revenue from a different 
investment) eclipses the expected capitalized value of the rental property, that 
property will not be developed as such, further constraining available supply and 
increasing market rental prices, exacerbating the shortage that the policy was meant 
ameliorate. 
 
The dynamic between capitalized value and opportunity cost also applies to 
current rental properties. If rent increases are insufficient to keep the potential 
capitalized value of a rental property above that of other uses, that property will be 
converted to another use. Figure 5 models such a scenario. This figure shows how 
such policies affect demand for rental properties, all other land uses, and the 
combined demand for all land uses. In this model, the reduced revenue potential of 
rental properties acts to reduce the overall demand for those properties. However, 
demand for non-rental properties is unaffected. As rent falls from P0 to P1, the 
quantity of rental units on the market also falls from QR to QR’. Since the total land 
supply is finite and inelastic, the rent decrease converts those lost units to other 
uses, increasing their quantity from QO to QO’. 
 
 
11 Friedman, The Microeconomics of Public Policy Analysis, 521. 
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Figure 5: Rent Control & Land Use Conversion. 
 
This model reveals the importance of the setting of the allowed rent increases for 
maintaining properties in use as rental units. Per Friedman, “Allowed rent increases 
must be sufficient to keep the capitalized value of the property greater in apartment 
use than in any other use. If not, the landlord has an incentive to change the use. 
Rent control ordinances that allow only building costs and maintenance expenses 
to be passed on to tenants will generally cause inefficiency in the long run.”12 This 
is one reason why SB-608 sets the increase cap at 7% + CPI. This way, it will 
capture not only increases in the cost of maintaining the property, but also accounts 
for the opportunity costs associated with the investment. If the potential value of 
other investments, property or other, were superior, disinvestment in rental 






12 Friedman, The Microeconomics of Public Policy Analysis, 536. 
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It is evident that the authors of SB-608 were cognizant of many of these 
inefficiencies, as several are clearly addressed in the legislation. The first and most 
notable to many people is the rent increase cap. As Tenants United has noted in its 
editorials on the topic, the cap of 7% + CPI is less rent stabilization and more a 
measure to prevent price gouging.13 However, it is likely that this is exactly the 
intention of the authors. Aware of the market failures caused by caps that prevent 
prices from rising to the long-term equilibrium and the disinvestment that can result 
from potential capitalized value falling below other opportunities and uses, the 
authors set the increase cap at a level that allows for long-run increases to cover 
both maintenance and other opportunity costs. And while the organization is correct 
in that 7% + CPI is greater than the overall growth of rents in the entire state through 
the housing crunch, it would have prevented the most egregious increases in 
Portland, where it is most applicable. And while rent freezes are best in short-term 
circumstances and when implemented at the onset of a crisis, the hope is that this 





Figure 6: Cost growth of rental housing in Portland, OR. Source: cityobservatory.org.14 
 
13 Portland Tenants United, “Senate Bill 608: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly,” February 13, 
2019, https://medium.com/@ptu/senate-bill-608-c87a76a76650. 
14 CityObservatory. “Portland rents are going down,” July 23, 2018, 
http://cityobservatory.org/portland-rents-are-going-down/. 
Brown: Rent Control Policies & Oregon SB-608





It is also worth noting that there are further nuances to the rent increase cap. First, 
the cap does not apply to properties in the first 15 years after being granted a 
certificate of occupancy. This primarily addresses the disinvestment question. By 
excluding new construction, initial owners can benefit from a higher potential 
capitalized value, preventing a decline in development of new rental property. And 
since it applies to the certificate of occupancy and not only initial construction, 
significant renovation or rehabilitation of older properties are also excluded, 
keeping such projects as viable investments. Second, rent may be reset on a change 
in tenant, but only if the previous tenant leaves voluntarily. This provision is one 
of many imposed in the legislation to protect existing tenants from the incentive to 
landlords to evict in order to maximize rent revenues. 
 
While the headline of the bill is certainly going to be the rent increase cap, 
the majority of the bill deals with eviction protections. And as we have discussed 
in this report, such protections can help evade some of the worst inefficiency 
outcomes of rent control policy, particularly those mentioned in the section on 
housing exchange. Under the bill, no-cause evictions are banned after the first year 
of tenancy (unless owner lives on the property). Eviction is in fact only allowed 
after the first year for a few specific causes including conversion to owner-occupied 
(either the present owner, their family, or through sale to a new owner who intends 
to occupy), significant repair or renovation, or change of use. Even in such 
circumstances, unless the property has four or fewer units, the owner must pay 
relocation expenses including one month’s rent. 
 
The provision that exempts eviction for change of use is concerning given 
the general effect of many rent control ordinances to incentivize such conversions. 
However, it seems that the authors of the bill believed that the 7% + CPI cap and 
other provisions provide enough space to make sure that most properties remain in 





Rent control policies are controversial. They create significant winners and losers 
and raise serious questions about the prioritization of certain segments of society 
with others and economic concerns with moral ones. With such dynamics, it is a 
given that there are no easy answers, at least not to those not given to ideological 
posturing. The fact is that housing is both an economic system and a human one, 
with very real ramifications for those involved, which just happens to be everyone. 
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It is true that rent control policies often engender significant inefficiency, 
both in their substance and their specific application, but economic efficiency 
cannot be the sole determinant of public policy. It must balance equity with 
efficiency, and in circumstances where housing, a principal necessity for every 
person and a dominant budgetary component for most households, is concerned, 
we must be willing to have hard conversations about how we balance those values. 
 
It is the belief of the author of this report, that while rent control policies are 
often ill-advised and reflexive (and frequently too tardy to ameliorate the worst 
scenarios), the authors of SB-608 have given a great deal of consideration to the 
economic questions inherent in any such policy and have, by and large, addressed 
them. Whether they are successful will not be known in the immediate future, and 
it is supremely advisable that the impacts of this legislation are carefully monitored 
going forward so that it may be altered and adapted as needed to protect renters 
from the imposition of unconstrained housing price growth without sacrificing the 
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